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“Lawful Act” Duress 
 
“Economic duress” has now been recognised as part of English law for around forty years: see, 
for instance, Occidental Worldwide Investment Corp v Skibs A/S Avanti (The Siboen and The Sibotre) [1976] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep. 293, 334-336 (Kerr J.); North Ocean Shipping Co v Hyundai Construction Co (The Atlantic 
Baron) [1979] Q.B. 705; [1978] All E.R. 1170, 719 (Mocatta J). Yet its constituent elements remain 
controversial. One particularly difficult issue concerns the scope of “illegitimate pressure”, and 
whether that encompasses threats by a party to do something that he is lawfully entitled to do. So-
called “lawful act duress” has been recognised in principle as a possibility in a number of cases, 
most notably by the Court of Appeal in CTN Cash and Carry Ltd v Gallaher Ltd [1994] 4 All E.R. 
714. But there is no decision where lawful act duress forms part of the ratio decidendi.   
 
Nevertheless, in Times Travel (UK) Ltd v Pakistan International Airlines Corporation [2017] EWHC 1367 
(Ch), Warren J. confidently held that “the proposition is established” (at [253]) and that “[t]his is 
one of those cases where, although acting lawfully, the defendant ... has placed illegitimate pressure 
on [the claimant]” (at [262]). Times Travel might therefore be viewed as important confirmation of 
the existence of lawful act duress in English law. However, given the threats in Times Travel closely 
followed unlawful conduct by the defendant, it is suggested that caution is necessary. Whilst threats 
of unlawful acts such as contractual breach can fulfil the requirement that pressure be 
“illegitimate”, it remains unclear why lawful threats might also suffice.         
 
Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (“PIAC”) was the national flag carrier airline of 
Pakistan and operated the only direct flights between Pakistan and the UK. A number of UK travel 
agents brought claims against PIAC for commission that was due but, in breach of contract, had 
not been paid. In September 2012, PIAC gave notice to all its UK agents that it would exercise its 
contractual right to terminate their agency agreements. Enclosed with the notice was a proposed 
new agency agreement. That not only set out a new (and less generous) basis for calculating 
commission, but also required the travel agents to give up any accrued claims for commission and 
not participate in the proceedings being brought against PIAC.  
 
The claimants – Times Travel (“TT”) and Nottingham Travel (“NT”) – ran small travel agencies 
focused on serving their local Pakistani communities. Their revenues were almost entirely 
dependent on selling PIAC’s tickets. Without access to those tickets, both claimants would quickly 
go out of business. That prospect loomed large not only because of the termination notice; at the 
same time, PIAC had substantially cut the claimants’ allocation of tickets for the duration of the 
notice period in order to increase the pressure on the claimants to sign the new agreement. 
Significantly, reducing the ticket allocation was not itself a breach of contract. 
 
Each of the claimants met with PIAC after receiving notice of termination. They protested the 
unfairness of the new agreement. But they were told that once the new agreement was signed, 
ticket allocations would be restored. PIAC also promised each claimant that, while the new 
agreement only ran until the end of 2012, the incentives under it would be paid “well into the 
future”. Further, in its meeting with NT, PIAC promised that the travel agency would receive the 
same benefits which the other travel agencies might achieve in their litigation against the airline. 
Faced with the prospect of being put out of business in a matter of weeks, the claimants had little 
practical choice but to sign the new agreements.  
 
The facts of Times Travel raised a number of issues at trial, including whether PIAC’s assurances to 
the claimants amounted to collateral contracts (yes), whether a claim in misrepresentation could 
lie (no), and whether the new agreements might be subject to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
(no). This note focuses on the most significant part of Warren J.’s judgment, namely whether TT 
and NT could rescind the subsisting contractual arrangements on the basis of duress. The judge 
began by identifying (at [248]) the three “necessary ingredients” for a successful economic duress 
claim: (1) illegitimate pressure which (2) causes the claimant to enter into the contract; and (3) the 
practical effect of the pressure is that there is compulsion on, or a lack of practical choice for, the 
claimant. It is doubtful that (2) and (3) are distinct; the claimant’s lack of practical choice but to 
enter into the contract answers the question of whether the illegitimate pressure caused the 
contract to arise.  
 
In any event, Warren J. then cited (at [250]) the well-known passage of Dyson J. in DSND Subsea 
Ltd v Petroleum Geo Services ASA [2000] B.L.R. 530 at [131] as an accurate statement of the law: 
“In determining whether there has been illegitimate pressure, the courts take into account 
a range of factors. These include whether there has been an actual or threatened breach of 
contract; whether the person allegedly exerting the pressure has acted in good or bad faith; 
whether the victim had any realistic practical alternative but to submit to the pressure; 
whether the victim protested at the time; and whether he affirmed and sought to rely on 
the contract. These are all relevant factors. Illegitimate pressure must be distinguished from 
the rough and tumble of the pressures of normal commercial bargaining.”  
This passage mixes up the distinct elements of a duress claim, and is inconsistent with the earlier 
identification by Warren J. of three necessary ingredients for economic duress. Dyson J. was wrong 
to treat issues of causation and affirmation merely as “factors” in determining when pressure is 
illegitimate, and it is unfortunate that it has been cited in subsequent cases, such as Times Travel, 
without further analysis or criticism.  
 
Warren J. focussed on PIAC’s threats not to provide the claimants with their expected allocation 
of tickets and to terminate their agency agreements. Because those threats were, in themselves, 
lawful, the proposition that lawful conduct can in some circumstances amount to duress needed 
to be established. Somewhat surprisingly, counsel for the claimants relied on Cantor Index Ltd v 
Shortall [2002] All E.R. (D) 161 (Nov), which involved a threatened breach of contract and was 
therefore a clear example of unlawful act duress, as Warren J. rightly pointed out (at [251]). No 
other cases appear to have been cited to the judge in support of lawful act duress.  
 
But beyond obiter dicta of prominent judges, no decision clearly turns upon the existence of lawful 
act duress. Two cases often cited both actually involved unlawful conduct. The first case is Progress 
Bulk Carriers Ltd v Tube City IMS LLC [2012] EWHC 273 (Comm); [2012] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 855. 
Ship owners withdrew their ship from a charterparty in breach of contract. The owners offered a 
substitute vessel and to pay full compensation but, soon after, demanded that the charterers waive 
their rights to damages for the breach of contract in return for the substitute vessel. The charterers, 
facing serious losses, accepted these terms under protest. Cooke J. held that the later threat to 
refuse to agree to a variation of the charterparty was lawful but could not be divorced from the 
owners’ prior breach of contract; the lawful threat “has to been seen both in the light of that prior 
repudiatory breach which was unlawful and the [o]wners’ subsequent attempts to take advantage 
of the position created by that unlawfulness” (at [42]). Progress Bulk Carriers is therefore better 
viewed as a case of unlawful act duress because the owners’ threats to refuse to vary the 
charterparty were part of the same chain of events as their prior breach of contract. 
 
In the second case, Borrelli v Ting [2010] UKPC 21; [2010] Bus L.R. 1718, the claimants were the 
liquidators of a Bermudan company, “Akai”, of which Mr Ting had been the corrupt and 
incompetent chairman and CEO. Ting, through other companies, also held a minority 
shareholding in Akai. The claimants proposed a scheme of arrangement to raise money to fund 
the liquidation. Under Bermudan company law, that scheme had to be approved by Akai’s 
shareholders. Ting threatened to use his indirect stake in Akai to prevent the scheme of 
arrangement, unless the liquidators entered into a settlement agreement under which they agreed 
not to pursue any claim against him. This they did. When the extent of Ting’s wrongdoing whilst 
at the helm of Akai was discovered, the liquidators brought claims against him arguing that the 
settlement agreement was voidable for duress. This was upheld by the Privy Council. The case 
could be understood as involving lawful act duress because shareholders were entitled to vote 
against the scheme. But there are two alternative approaches which allow the case to be seen as 
involving unlawful act duress. The first turns on the fact that all Ting’s actions in opposing the 
scheme in order to force the liquidators to give up their claims against him were in breach of his 
duties under local insolvency law to co-operate in the liquidation (see [32]). The second approach 
is similar to that in Progress Bulk Carriers. Ting had engaged in forgery and perjury in support of his 
opposition to the scheme of arrangement (see e.g. [7]); his threat to vote against the scheme could 
not be separated from those illegal acts.  
 
Despite a lack of case law in support, Warren J. nevertheless felt able to conclude (at [252]) that 
lawful act duress exists on the basis of a passage from Chitty on Contracts (32nd ed., 2015, at [8-
046]). Chitty states that “there can be no doubt that even a threat to commit what would otherwise 
be a perfectly lawful act may be improper if the threat is coupled with a demand which goes 
substantially beyond what is normal or legitimate in commercial arrangements”, but again without 
citing cases in support. The example provided to justify this assertion concerns blackmail. But 
blackmail is an example of unlawful act duress, albeit that the threat itself is the unlawful element 
rather than the threatened conduct. Blackmail should not be elided with lawful act duress or used 
to justify the existence of lawful act duress. In any event, there was no question of blackmail in 
Times Travel. Rather, the threat was simply that the airline would exercise its rights not to allocate 
tickets to the claimants in the future. 
 
The judge held that TT had made out its case for lawful act duress (at [262]). It is hard to shake 
the impression that this conclusion followed from a value judgment as to PIAC’s conduct and the 
fairness of the new terms. TT had been a “successful, honest and reliable agent with a substantial 
period of loyal service” (idem.). It was unfair to present it with the stark choice of signing the new 
agreement, thereby giving up its accrued rights to commission, or going out of business. This 
impression is further fuelled by Warren J.’s conclusion with respect to NT, whose position differed 
from TT in one respect only. As noted above, NT had received an additional assurance from PIAC 
which amounted to a term in its collateral contract to the effect that it would receive any additional 
benefits reaped by the other travel agents who were taking PIAC to court. Warren J. held that this 
term “eliminate[d] the objectionable element of the New Agreement, namely the giving up of all 
past claims” (at [268]). In other words, NT did not deserve the option of setting aside the new 
agreement and its collateral contract, for it had not been forced into an unfair bargain. It is hard 
to see why this should bar duress: the fact that the airline was more generous in its new terms to 
NT does not mean that NT freely consented to those terms. Like TT, NT also had no practical 
choice but to sign the new agreement or go out of business.  
 
Times Travel could be disruptive to many commercial agreements. The underlying story – a small 
business entirely dependent for its survival on its dealings with a large company – is not an 
uncommon one. Previously that story left the common law unmoved. For example, Lord Denning 
M.R.’s attempts to introduce a general principle of inequality of bargaining power into the 
common law (e.g. Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] 1 Q.B. 326; [1974] 3 All E.R. 757) were firmly 
rejected by the House of Lords. In National Westminster Bank v Morgan [1985] A.C. 686; [1985] 1 
All E.R. 821, Lord Scarman said that any mischief arising from inequality of bargaining power was 
for Parliament to redress, not the common law. Yet Parliament has not even acted on the Law 
Commission’s recommendations (Law Com No. 292, 2005, Part 5) to extend to small businesses 
statutory protection from unfair terms currently enjoyed by consumers. Nevertheless, Times Travel 
perhaps suggests that lawful exploitation of inequality of bargaining power may now, in rare 
instances, be policed at common law by the doctrine of duress. If correct, its application should 
not turn on the court’s value judgments as to the fairness of the bargain struck. Further principles 
are needed to give certainty to contracting parties.  
 
In Progress Bulk Carriers, Cooke J. thought that whether the defendant acted in good or bad faith 
was a “critically important characteristic” (at [27]; see too CTN Cash & Carry at 719 and DSND at 
[131], quoted above). This emphasis sits uncomfortably with contract law’s refusal to impose a 
general duty of good faith on contracting parties, and should be jettisoned. In Times Travel, PIAC’s 
course of action in serving notice under the old agreement and proposing the new agreement was 
intended to ensure that the claimants gave up any accrued rights to commission. But Warren J. 
pulled back from finding that PIAC’s conduct was in bad faith: that was a moot point “on which 
different minds might take different views” (at [262]). The judge’s caution on this point is 
appropriate. On the one hand, Warren J. found that at least some of the claims to commission 
under the old agreement were clearly valid at the time that they were first asserted. PIAC’s bad 
faith in demanding the claimants waive any claims might be inferred on the basis of this finding. 
On the other hand, it is understandable that PIAC took a commercial decision to work only with 
travel agents who were not pursuing claims against it. The difficulty in reaching a conclusion on 
this issue highlights the amorphous nature of good faith.  
 
What might separate Times Travel from the usual rough and tumble of commercial negotiations is 
that PIAC was in breach of contract in respect of commission due but not paid under the old 
agency agreement. While PIAC’s threat to end contractual relations with the travel agents was 
something it was entitled to do, it nonetheless was part of a “single chain of events” which started 
with PIAC’s breach of contract (at [261]); indeed, its objective in making that threat was that it be 
excused that unlawful conduct. It would be artificial to look at the lawfulness of the threat or 
threatened conduct narrowly, in isolation from the wider circumstances that involved unlawful 
conduct. Viewed from this perspective, caution should be exercised in treating Times Travel as 
confirmation of the existence of lawful act duress in English law. It should be read as going no 
further than Progress Bulk Carriers in recognising that a lawful threat may render a contract voidable 
because it is inextricably linked to previous unlawful conduct. 
 
Understood in this limited fashion, Times Travel should not further aggravate current uncertainties 
as to the scope of economic duress. But nor does it bring much clarity. In particular, where – as 
in Progress Bulk Carriers and Times Travel – one party has compromised potential claims but now 
wishes to start litigation, the other party cannot be sure that the settlement agreement will hold up 
on the basis that no unlawful threat was made to induce the contract. In some circumstances, it 
seems that the claimant can now avoid such an agreement because, notwithstanding its lawfulness, 
the defendant’s threat was part of the same chain of events as the unlawful conduct which is the 
subject of the settlement. This could undermine the finality of settlement agreements.  
 
Despite obiter dicta to the contrary, it seems that English law still only recognises duress in three 
circumstances: (1) where the threat itself is unlawful; (2) where the threat is to do something 
unlawful; and (3) where the threat is part of the same chain of events as unlawful conduct. Since 
even the third category involves an element of unlawfulness, it may be better to do away with the 
language of “lawful act” duress. The question of lawful act duress beyond these three categories 
has arisen because of a predisposition by some judges to “never say never” to that possibility (see 
especially CTN Cash & Carry at 719 (Steyn L.J.)), but the courts should now place the law on a 
more certain and stable footing by explicitly rejecting such an open-ended doctrine (see further R. 
Ahdar, “Contract doctrine, predictability and the nebulous exception” [2014] C.L.J. 39). Indeed, it 
would be open to the Court of Appeal further to restrict economic duress by abolishing the third 
category: there is a clear difference between lawful and unlawful behaviour and no good reason 
has yet been given why lawfully applied pressure, even if closely connected to unlawful conduct, 
can be “illegitimate”.   
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